In order to track progress on MDG 1 and explicitly link growth, inequality, and poverty reduction, several measures of pro-poor growth have been proposed in the literature. However, current concepts and measurements of propoor growth are entirely focused on the income dimension of well-being, which neglects the multidimensionality of poverty and well-being. There are no corresponding measures for tracking progress on non-income dimensions of poverty.
Introduction
Pro-poor growth has recently become a central issue for researchers and policy makers, especially in the context of reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The various proposals to measure pro-poor growth have also allowed a much more detailed assessment of progress on reducing poverty as they explicitly examine growth along the entire income distribution.
However, one existing shortcoming of current pro-poor growth concepts and measurements is that they are completely focused on income, thus focused only on MDG 1 with the aim to halve the incidence of poverty until 2015. 1 The shortcoming of the one-dimensional focus on income is that a reduction in income poverty does not guarantee a reduction in non-income dimensions of poverty, such as education or health. This means that finding pro-poor growth in income does not automatically mean that non-income poverty has also been reduced (Klasen, 2000; Grimm et al., 2002) . In this context, Kakwani and Pemia (2000) note that it would be 'futile' if one operationalizes poverty reduction via pro-poor growth using just one single indicator because poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon, and thus pro-poor growth is also multidimensional. For this reasons, multidimensionality of poverty and pro-poor growth as two main research areas have to be combined. While non-income indicators have recently received more and more attention in the concept and measurement of poverty they have not in the concept of pro-poor growth and no attempts have been made to measure pro-poor growth on the basis of non-income indicators. 2 Also international organizations point to the importance of the direct outcomes of poverty reduction such as health and education (World Bank, 2000; UN et al., 2000; UN, 2000) .
The aim of this paper is to introduce the multidimensionality of poverty into the pro-poor growth measurement. The basic idea of doing so goes back to Sen's capability approach (Sen, 1987 (Sen, , 1988 . Defining human well-being in terms of functionings and capabilities, 3 Sen (1987 Sen ( , 1988 considers poverty as a multidimensional phenomenon and focusses on direct outcomes of human well-being. Since money-metric indicators of poverty reflect only the ability to achieve functionings, it serves only as an indirect measure of the standard of living, whereas direct measures are, for example, the status of, and access to, health and education. Based on this approach, many poverty assessments including social indica-tors have been conducted using aggregate data or household-level data (UNDP, 1996; Klasen, 2000; Grimm et al., 2002) . However, non-income indicators have not been considered in the pro-poor growth measurement so far.
We introduce the multidimensionality of poverty into the pro-poor growth measurement by applying the growth incidence curve (GIC) by Ravallion and Chen (2003) to non-income indicators and call our resulting graphs non-income growth incidence curves (NIGIC). We illustrate this approach using micro-data for Bolivia for 1989 and 1998. We distinguish between (i) ranking the sample by each non-income indicator, and (ii) ranking the sample by income and investigate based on this income ranking the changes of the non-income indicator with respect to the position in the income distribution. In addition to investigating growth rates, we investigate absolute changes of the non-income indicators. We find that growth was pro-poor both in the income and in the non-income dimension, but results for the non-income dimensions are less clear for the non-income development when the poor are ranked by income.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 briefly gives an overview of the concept of pro-poor growth and the need to investigate it in a multidimensional perspective. Section 3.3 explains our methodology to apply the GIC to non-income indicators and discuss some limitations. Section 3.4 presents the results of the GIC and the NIGIC for selected variables and for a composite welfare index. Section 3.5 summarizes and gives an outlook for future research.
The Concept of Pro-Poor Growth

Definition of Pro-Poor Growth
According to some, pro-poor growth is simply economic growth that benefits the poor (UN et al., 2000; OECD, 2001 OECD, , 2006 . This definition, however, provides little information how to measure or how to implement it. What remains to be specified is, first, if economic growth benefits the poor and, second, if yes to what extent. For example, Klasen (2004) provides more explicit requirements that a definition of pro-poor growth needs to satisfy. The first requirement is that the measure differentiates between growth that benefits the poor and other forms of economic growth, and it has to answer the question by how much the poor benefited. The second requirement is that the poor have benefited disproportionately more than the non-poor. The third requirement is that the assessment is sensitive to the distribution of incomes among the poor. The fourth requirement is that the measure allows an overall judgement of economic growth and not focuses only on the gains of the poor. Besides this approach there exist several other attempts conceptualizing pro-poor growth. 4 Categorizing the different and conflicting definitions, we speak of three definitions of pro-poor growth in our paper: weak absolute pro-poor growth, relative pro-poor growth, and strong absolute pro-poor growth (Klasen, 2008a) . Pro-poor growth in the weak absolute sense means that the income growth rates are, on average, above O for the poor. Pro-poor growth in the relative sense means that the income growth rates of the poor are higher than the average growth rates, thus that relative inequality falls (i.e., in which some indicator considering the relative gap between the rich and the poor falls). Pro-poor growth in the strong absolute sense requires that absolute income increases of the poor are stronger than the average, thus, that absolute inequality falls (i.e., some measure considering the absolute gap between the rich and the poor falls, e.g., Klasen (2004) ). 5 The different definitions of pro-poor growth are illustrated in Table 3 .1, which is taken from Klasen (2008a) . Table 3 .1 shows a country in which the poor earn $100 per capita and the non-poor $500 per capita in the initial period. In year 1, the income of the poor grow by 3 percent and the income of the non-poor grow by 2 percent. In terms of the pro-poor growth definitions, this is pro-poor in the weak absolute sense (i.e., growth rates are above 0) and in the relative sense (i.e., the growth rate for the poor is higher than for the non-poor). In year 2, the income of the poor grow by l percent and the income of the non-poor also by 1 percent. This is pro-poor only in the weak absolute sense, since the the poor have only benefited proportionately from growth, which illustrates the importance of the relative and absolute definition of pro-poor growth in order to reduce inequality. In year 3, the income of the poor grow by 6 percent and the income of the non-poor by 9 percent. This illustrates the advantage of the weak absolute definition of pro-poor growth. Even if the benefit is not pro-poor in the relative sense, only the weak absolute definition captures that the poor also have made improvements (even if inequality rises). In year 4, the income of the poor grow more than the income of the nonpoor showing pro-poor growth in the weak absolute and relative sense. Moreover, the growth is also pro-poor in the strong absolute sense since the absolute increase in income for the poor ($20) is higher than for the non-poor ($15). Table 3 .1 illustrates that the definition of strong absolute pro-poor growth is obviously the strictest definition of pro-poor growth and the hardest to achieve, which is also shown empirically by White and Anderson (2000) . This is why most researchers concentrate, in general, on the weak absolute and relative definitions. But this ignores that decreases in relative inequality might be-and often are-accompanied by increases in absolute inequality, which is seen as undesirable by many and can be an important source of social tension (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2004; Duclos and Wodon, 2004; Klasen, 2004) . Conversely, growth that is associated with falling absolute inequality would be particularly pro-poor and, therefore, it is useful to consider this strong absolute concept as well. This is particularly important when examining pro-poor growth in the nonincome dimension of poverty where even pro-poor growth in the relative definition might not be seen as sufficiently pro-poor. Consider the case where the 'education-poor' increased their education level from 1 to 2 years, an increase of 100 percent, while the rich increased their education level from 10 to 12 years, an increase of 20 percent. This would be pro-poor growth in the relative definition as relative inequality falls, but most observers would also note the rise in absolute inequality and might, therefore, not consider this type of educational expansion 'pro-poor' since no educational degree is achieved. Furthermore, only concentrating on percentage changes in education misses that the poor should catch up to the non-poor regarding specific degrees in education. Concentrating also on absolute changes allows one to examine, for example, whether a poor individual achieved the level of primary or secondary education. 6
Multidimensionality of Pro-Poor Growth
The most glaring shortcoming of all attempts to define and measure pro-poor growth is that they rely exclusively on one single indicator, which is income. This means that they are only focussed on MDG 1 but leave out the multidimensionality of poverty, which is taken into account in the other MDGs.
Income enables households and/or individuals to obtain functionings. This means, income serves to expand peoples' choice sets (capabilities) (Sen, 1987 (Sen, , 1988 and is, therefore, an indirect measure of poverty. In contrast, certain nonincome indicators measure the functionings of households and individuals directly. Measuring poverty only with income assumes that income growth is accompanied by non-income growth. However, the problem of focussing only on MDG 1 is that an improving income situation of households need not automatically imply an improving non-income situation, thus, reaching the other MDGs is not automatically guaranteed (for example, as shown in Klasen (2000) or Grimm et al. (2002) ). While non-income indicators have recently received more and more attention in the concept and measurement of poverty they have not in the concept of pro-poor growth and no attempts have been made so far to measure pro-poor growth on the basis of non-income indicators.
Following Sen (1987 Sen ( , 1988 , our conceptual approach to introduce non-income indicators in the pro-poor growth measurement starts with the selection of nonincome indicators determining the most important functionings of human welfare. In line with the MDGs (UN et al., 2000) we select education, health, nutrition, and mortality as non-income indicators of poverty and, therefore, follow the spirit of the most prominent multidimensional poverty indices such as the Human Development Index, the Human Poverty Index, and the Physical Quality of Life Index by UNDP (1991 UNDP ( , 2000 . After having selected the indicators and defined related variables we investigate whether non-income growth was pro-poor between two points in time. We do this exemplarily in applying the methodology of the growth incidence curve (GIC) to non-income indicators, but non-income pro-poor growth can also be applied to other pro-poor growth measures. We also compare the results based on non-income indicators with those based on income.
Methodology
The Growth Incidence Curve
To answer the question if and to what extent growth was pro-poor one can investigate the growth rates of the poor, i.e., those who were below the poverty line in the initial period. A useful tool for this purpose is the GIC (Ravallion and Chen, 2003) which shows the mean growth rate g1 in income y at each percentile p of the distribution between two points in time, t-1 and t. The GIC links the growth rates of different percentiles and is given by .
Yr(P)
GIC. gr(P) = --(-) -1.
Yt-1 P (3.1)
By comparing the two points in time, the GIC plots the population percentiles (from 1-100 ranked by income) on the horizontal axis against the annual per capita growth rate in income of the respective percentile. If the GIC is above 0 for all percentiles (g1 (p) > 0 for all p ), then it indicates weak absolute pro-poor growth. If the GIC is negatively sloped it indicates relative pro-poor growth. It is important to note that we assume anonymity throughout, i.e., we consider the growth rates of percentiles, even though they contain different households in the two points in time. 7 For a discussion of this and results when the anonymity axiom is lifted, see Grimm (2007) .
Starting from the GIC, Ravallion and Chen (2003) define the pro-poor growth rate (PPGR) as the area under the GIC up to the poverty headcount ratio H. The PPGR is formally expressed by 1 {H' PPGR = gf = Hr lo gr(p)dp,
which is equivalent to the mean of the growth rates of the poor up to the headcount ( of the first period, thus evaluated at t -1 ). What is normally done in poverty assessments is to compare the PPGR with the growth rate in mean (GRIM). The GRIM is defined by µt GRIM= Yt = --1 , 14-1
where µ is mean income. If the PPGR exceeds the GRIM, growth is declared to be pro-poor in the relative sense.
Examining pro-poor growth in the strong absolute sense, one has to concentrate on the absolute changes in income of the population percentiles between the two points in time. We define the absolute GIC by (3.4) 7 One should be cautious when deducing policy implications from the GIC when assuming anonymity. In particular, the GIC allows not to show if, for example, specific policy measures were beneficial to those who where poor in the initial period, but can show if the poor over the period have benefited more from the measures than the non-poor.
Melanie Grosse -9783631753538 Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/03/2019 11:16:24PM via free access which shows the absolute changes 8 for each percentile. By comparing the two periods, the absolute GIC plots the population percentiles on the horizontal axis against the annual per capita change in income of the respective percentile on the vertical axis. If the absolute GIC is negatively sloped it indicates strong absolute pro-poor growth.
Starting from the absolute GIC, we define the 'pro-poor change' (PPCH) as the area under the absolute GIC up to the headcount H. The PPCH is formally expressed by l l oH,
which is equivalent to the mean of the changes of the poor up to the headcount. We compare the PPCH with the change in mean (CHIM), which is defined by
If the PPCH exceeds the CHIM, growth is declared to be pro-poor in the strong absolute sense.
The Non-Income Growth Incidence Curve
The calculation of the non-income growth incidence curves (NIGIC) broadly follows the concept of the GIC. Instead of income (y), we apply Equations (3.1) through (3.6) to selected non-income indicators to measure pro-poor growth directly via outcome-based welfare indicators. Thus, the NIGIC measures pro-poor growth not in an income sense but in a non-income sense, e.g., the improvement of the health status or the educational level between two points in time for each percentile of the distribution.
We calculate the NIGIC in two different ways. The first way we call the unconditional NIGIC in which we rank the individuals by each respective non-income variable and generate the population percentiles based on this ranking. For example, using average years of schooling of adult household members, the 'poorest' percentile is now not the income-poorest percentile but the one with the lowest average household educational attainment.
The second way, we call conditional NIGIC in which we rank the individuals by income and calculate based on this income ranking the population percentiles of the non-income variable. With the conditional NIGIC, we capture the problem that the assignment of the households to income percentiles on the one hand (GIC) and to non-income percentiles on the other hand (unconditional NIGIC) might not be the same. For example, the income-poorest group might not be the education-poorest group at the same time. This is taken into account in the conditional NIGIC where the percentiles are income percentiles, thus that the 'poorest' percentile is the one with lowest income, but that the growth rates are non-income growth rates, thus, are calculated for, e.g., years of schooling of the income percentiles. With the conditional NIGIC, we measure how the development of the non-income indicators is distributed across income groups.
Both ways of calculating the NIGIC are of particular relevance for policy making. The unconditional NIGIC mirrors the development of the social indicators that are relevant for human welfare. Thus, it can monitor how the non-income MDGs (especially MDGs 2-6) have developed over time for different points of the non-income distribution. In order to reach the MDGs, improvements will be particularly important for those at the lower end of distribution of the non-income achievements and the NIGIC allows such an assessment. The conditional NIGIC give an additional tool to investigate how the progress in non-income dimensions of poverty was distributed over the income distribution. This is also of relevance when evaluating distributional impacts of aid and public spending. Standard benefit incidence studies, for example, analyze the impact of public spending by calculating shares of the total spending to each percentile and comparing the shares of the income poorest with the income richest centile (see, e.g., Van de Walle and Nead (1995) , Van de Walle (1998) , Lanjouw and Ravallion (1998), Roberts (2003) ). But the share of public spending for the poor serves only as a proxy for a real welfare impact in terms of non-income achievements. With the conditional NIGIC, it is possible to analyze the actual improvements in the particular social indicator over the income distribution. For example, it provides an instrument to assess if public social spending programs have reached the targeted income-poorest population groups and if the public resources are effectively allocated and used. For example, Berthelemy (2006) shows that education policies in Sub-Saharan Africa are biased against the poor. On average, policies favor the non-poor because they are concentrated on improvements in secondary and tertiary education and only little attention is paid to improvements in primary eduction, i.e., to the poor population. In this respect, the conditional NIGIC might be a useful tool in the pro-poor spending analysis to understand who benefits from public spending and to what extent.
When interpreting the NIGIC, three issue need to be discussed. First, in comparing the GIC and the NIGIC, one cannot deduce any causality between income and non-income indicators. For example, from the curves, we can neither say that an improvement in income causes an improvement in the health status nor that an improvement in the health status causes an improvement in income. They simply show how improvements in income and non-income indicators are related to each other, which might be due to causal or spurious correlations. Second, one cannot compare the absolute values of the growth rates of income and non-income variables because the variables are measured in different dimensions such as monthly income or years of schooling. One can only compare if the growth rates are positive or negative and by how much the PPGR exceeds the GRIM. Lastly, due to the different dimensions of the income and non-income indicators, and the fact that many of the non-income indicators are bounded above (i.e., there is an upper limit to survival prospects or to educational achievements), 9 it may well be plausible that different definitions of 'pro-poor growth' would be appropriate for different indicators. While one may be satisfied that income growth was pro-poor if it met the relative definition (i.e., the poor had higher income growth rates than the rich), one may only call growth in educational achievements pro-poor if the poor had higher absolute increments than the non-poor. 10
Specification of the Non-Income Indicators
We calculate the unconditional and conditional NIGIC for education, health, nutrition, and for a composite welfare index (CWI) as described below. We are working with DHS data for Bolivia from the years 1989 and 1998 that do not contain information on income or consumption due to its focus on demographics, health, and fertility. However, in our DHS data set, we use simulated incomes based on a dynamic cross-survey micro-simulation methodology introduced by Klasen et al. (2007) , which is also outlined in Essay 1. 11 The basic idea of this simulation methodology is the following. The authors use two kinds of surveys: first, the DHS ( of 1989 and 1998) and, second, the Bolivian household surveys (the 2 nd EIH of 1989 and the ECH of 1999). Then they estimate an income corre-lation in the household survey, apply the coefficients to the DHS, and predict, i.e., simulate, incomes in the DHS. 12 For each non-income indicator, we identify alternative variables to capture particular aspects of the non-income dimension in question. For education, we specify eight different variables. We calculate average years of schooling for all adult household members and for males and females separately. Age plays an important role when analyzing changes in non-income indicators, especially for education. In particular, not much improvements in education can be expected among the adult population (the education of 30-40 year olds in 1989 should not be be very different from the education of the 40-50 year olds in 1998). To avoid misleading conclusion from potential low improvements, we, therefore, restrict the sample to women 13 aged between 20 and 30 as only this age group is likely to have experienced a change in their educational achievement (the 20-30 year olds in 1998 represent a new cohort of women who were educated later than the other cohorts). In addition, we calculate the maximal education per household instead of the average for all adults, males, females, and females aged between 20 and 30. The idea behind using these variables as an indicator is that it might be sufficient that one household member is well educated to generate income for the whole household and to invest in education of other household members (i.e., intra-household externalities) (Basu and Foster, 1998) . 14 To take into account possible intra-household inequalities in education, we also calculate gender gaps 12 See Essay 1 for the methodology. To provide some summary here, the authors estimate an income/consumption expenditure model in the 1999 Living Standard Measurement Survey (LSMS) data, restricting the set of covariates to those which are also available in the 1998 DHS data and interacting all variables with a rural dummy. They then use the regression to predict incomes in the DHS and add a randomly distributed error term. They then repeat the procedure for the EIH of 1989, which is only available in urban areas. When imputing incomes in rural areas, they use the model for urban areas in 1989 and add the results of the rural interaction terms from 1999, assuming that the difference in the impact of income correlates between 1989 and 1999 did not change over time. There is a tendency that the simulated income growth is higher than the observed one. This overprediction should not bias the results in this paper, but it might be useful to test the results generated here with a survey that contains detailed information both on income and on non-income variables. This is done in Essay 4. 13 Toe DHS only includes households with at least one woman in reproductive age, i.e., aged between 15 and 49 who serve as respondents in the DHS. The education for the male household members has to be taken from the memory of the respondents concerning the education of their husband or partner (with the age of the men being unknown). Households without women in reproductive age are excluded as well as unmarried men.
14 An important issue is to be noted here: An overall problem of years of schooling as a variable for educational attainment is that years of schooling do not say anything about educational quality and, therefore, the indicator should be treated with some caution. This problem might be solved by using other data such as education test scores (like Pisa scores). However, these data are not always available and certainly not in the same data sets.
Melanie Grosse -9783631753538 Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/03/2019 11:16:24PM via free access in eduction within households. In particular, we calculate the female minus male education in the households (in years of education). For health, we specify three different variables. We calculate infant survival rates of children aged under 1 year and also for children aged under 5 years. 15 Furthermore, we take the average vaccinations of children aged between 1 and 5 per household, with a maximum of 8 possible vaccinations for each child. 16 The vaccination rate is a variable that represents access to health care and preventive medicines. A similar variable has, for example, been used in the monitoring of the health sector reform project in Bolivia in 1999 (Montes, 2003) .
For nutrition, we use stunting z-scores as the variable that measures chronical undernutrition for children aged between 1 and 5 years. The stunting z-scores are defined as the difference of height at a certain age and the median of the reference population for height at that age divided by the standard deviation of the reference population. For Bolivia, it takes values between approximately -6 and 6, where values below -2 are considered as being moderately undernourished and below -3 as being severely undernourished (Klasen, 2003 (Klasen, , 2008b . Problematic might be that the z-score contains a lot of 'genetic noise' in the sense that, for example, a low z-score interpreted as being undernourished might simply appear because the parents are genetically short and the child is also small but nevertheless well nourished and vice versa.
A further possibility to address the issue of the multidimensionality is to aggregate several indicators into a composite welfare index (CWl). 17 Here, we follow the methodology of the Human Development Index (HDI) to address the problem of difference scales of the variables (UN et al., 2000) . Each variable that enters the index is normalized to be between 0 and 1 in subtracting the individual value from the minimum value observed in the data set divided by the range
The CWI is constructed by simply averaging the sum of the selected variable scores n. It includes four of the above explained variables: average education 15 In our calculation, we use household child survival rates instead of child mortality rates. An improvement in child mortality comes out as a lower value but this lower value is mathematically interpreted as a deterioration. The linear transformation used is: survival rate= (mortality rate -1) * (-1 ). This means, for example that a reduction of child mortality from 40 percent to 20 percent is transformed into an increase in child survival from 60 percent to 80 percent. 16 The possible vaccinations are 3 against polio, 3 against DPT, 1 against measles, and I against BCG.
17 For a detailed overview about several composite welfare indices and how they are calculated, see, e.g., UNDP (2006) .
Melanie Grosse -9783631753538 Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/03/2019 11:16:24PM via free access of all adult household members, stunting z-scores, under 1 survival, and average vaccinations. 18 As not all variables are given for all households (e.g., health and nutrition variables are only available for households who have children), we calculate the CWI for two different samples. The first sample, called small sample, is the one for which all variables are available for all households. This reduces the sample size enormously (in 1989, e.g., from 6,053 to 1,306 households) and, more importantly, in a non-random fashion. 19 The second sample, called big sample, includes all households, but the index is averaged over fewer variables for those households, which do not have data for nutrition and/or health variables. The advantage of creating the CWI based on the big sample is the higher number of observations but the disadvantage is that the results for some percentiles are driven by very few, or even only one variable. The smaller sample has fewer observations but contains for all households the same number of variables. For both, the small and the big sample, we also augment the indices by also including simulated income 20 as a fourth indicator.
Limitations of the Indicators
While we show below that these indicators yield important information, there arise also a number of problems when analyzing non-income indicators of welfare, which also are important to note for the use of the NIGIC, but can also be seen as general inherent limitations of non-income indicators of human well-being to be aware of. The first limitation is the informational value of the calculated growth rates of the NIGIC, where we interpret an ordinal relation in a cardinal fashion. Examining an ordinally scaled variable one can say that 6 years of schooling is better than 3 years but one cannot be sure to say that the household is twice as 18 The latter two variables do not enter separately but form a health sub-index as the simple average of the two scores. In contrast to the HDI, we use the maximum and minimum values defined by the data sets ( over both data sets, thus not separately for each data set) and do not use fixed maximum and minimum values. This might be problematic because, first, the minima and maxima might be outliers, and second, because they will ( or alt least may) change if a third data set (or other countries) enter the analysis. However, for our paper it is less critical to use the minima and maxima of the two data sets because, first, our paper has a rather illustrative purpose and, second, the minima and maxima of most of the variables are the "natural ranges" of the indicators (e.g., education ranges from Oto 18 years, vaccinations from Oto 8 applications). 19 This reduction in observations translates into the calculation of the percentiles resulting in higher standard errors than for the large sample. 20 Note that we use the simulated value without adding an error term for the conditional NIGIC because this is the best income estimate for this purpose, i.e., for preserving the income ranking.
Melanie Grosse -9783631753538 Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/03/2019 11:16:24PM via free access well educated. 21 This ordinal scaling leads to two different kinds of interpretation problems. First, averaging an ordinally scaled variable leads to a ranking problem when assuming that education is one of the most important determinants to generate income and reduce poverty (Osberg, 2000) . For example, comparing two households, A and B, with two adults in each household where the household members of A have O and 12 years of schooling and of B have 6 and 7 years of schooling, household B has a higher average education than A. Now, when Bis ranked higher than A, one ignores any kind of educational degrees and the resulting differentials in returns to education. This means that the person with 12 years of schooling in A might earn disproportionately more income than both members of household B together, thus, household A should be ranked higher than B. We address this problem in also using maximal education per household.
In addition, averaging the years of schooling over the household ignores also possible intra-household inequalities in education. Taking into account the distribution of education within the household and, therefore, taking into account possible intra-household inequalities in education, we additionally focus on the individual educational attainment (instead of only on the average of the household) and on the gender gap in education of households.
Second, concerning the usual problem of absolute versus relative changes, here increases in years of schooling, just comparing growth rates might be misleading and might not reflect their true achievements. For example, Table 3 .2 shows for average education an increase of 80 percent for the 2 nd decile compared to 6 percent of the 9 th decile, which might be overstating the improvement for the poor because the years of schooling of the poor increase from 1.31 to 2.37 years of schooling and those of the non-poor from 11.73 to 12.43. In addition, improvements in tertiary education might be harder to achieve than improvements in primary education, which should also be taken into account. This problem is related to the fact that many of the non-income indicators are bounded above, i.e., there are firm or likely upper limits on such achievements. 100 percent survival in the first year is the upper limit for health, more than 18 or 19 years of education is very rare, more than 8 vaccinations is not recommended, done, or measured, etc. One may assume 'declining marginal returns' to improvements in non-income indicators, which would suggest that a marginal year of schooling or another vaccination is less valuable when the level of schooling is already high.
This problem is also discussed by Kakwani (1993a) . He derives an achievement function for non-income indicators based on the assumption that the value of the achievement increases non-linearly with the achievement level, i.e., an in-crease in I year of years of schooling or life expectancy starting from a higher level reflects greater achievement than an increase starting from a lower level because the effort necessary to achieve this increase is much higher for countries that are already close to the upper limit of achievement. In particular, Kakwani ( 1993a) derives an improvements index, which takes into account both the asymptotic limit of non-income indicators of standard of living and the non-linearity of the values of achievements. His achievement function Q takes the lower (min) and upper (max) bounds into account in using a logarithmic transformation of the following kind, with values between 0 and I: and max = 80. However, the value of this increase is based on the effort made to achieve but does not consider the value of the outcomes of this achievement. Since we are interested in the question whether the poor can catch up to the non-poor and, therefore, rather interested in investigating improvements in direct outcomes of social indicators than in the effort of these achievements, we do not weight the improvements in relative achievements.
Besides, in addition to the relative changes, we calculate the absolute NIGIC and pro-poor changes examining directly the absolute improvements in years of education. However, even when we use absolute changes for the example of education above, which equal approximately 1, a further question remains open. An increase of 1.06 years of schooling of the 2 th decile might be less beneficial because perhaps the persons are still more or less illiterate, compared to the increase of 0. 70 years of schooling in the 9 th decile, which might mean completing secondary schooling and getting a degree.
Another issue that arises due to the bounded-above problem of social indicators is that it may be the case (and indeed is the case in Bolivia) that some households have reached the upper limit, and further growth is not possible. However, our main focus is on the bottom of the distribution. Even if we observe improvements in, for example, education only for the lower deciles, we still can interpret these findings regarding the pro-poorness of improvements in the educational system, particularly whether the poor have benefited from these improvements.
The third type of problem in comparing relative changes relates to the stunting z-score. In our data sets, it ranges roughly from -6 to 6. Relative changes in the stunting z-score cannot be calculated because of the coexistence of negative, positive, and O values in the variable range. For example, how to compare the relative improvement from -2 to -1 with an improvement from 1 to 2 from the year 1989 to 1998? We reduce this problem by transforming the z-score in such a way that all values are positive, which means by adding the minimum value of both data sets to each z-score to get a range of only positive numbers.
Another limitation is the problem of weighting, which we illustrate with the example of child mortality. For example, comparing two households, A and B, where A has 1 child and B has 10 children the households should be weighted differently when in each of the two households 1 child dies. Household A has a child mortality rate of 100 percent whereas B of 'only' 10 percent. From an intrinsic point of view, it is obvious that both deaths are equally lamentable. In this case, one could think of just counting the death per household independently of the total number of children. However, it is less obvious from an economic point of view where children can be partly considered as investment goods. Here, a higher mortality rate mirrors the more heavy loss of 1 child in the 1-child household A compared to the IO-children household B. The investment-good character comes from absence or lack of social security systems in which case the children take care for the parents in the cases of unemployment, sickness, and old age (Ehrlich and Lui, 1997). 22 Following these two extreme points of view, one might think of weighting the death of children in households taking both arguments somehow into account. But any weighting would, however, be quite arbitrary and induce difficulties in justifying it with economic or welfare-theoretical judgments. Keeping this critical issue in mind we use unweighted child survival rates.
Weighting problems are also difficult with the nutrition indicator. A negative stunting z-score indicates malnourishment. But the z-score should not be interpreted as a linear variable in the sense that an increasing z-score is always equivalent to an improvement in the nutritional status. From a certain threshold onward, increasing z-scores might no longer reflect improvements of the nutritional status but indeed quite the opposite. For example, a child with a very high z-score of 3 might not be better off as one with O because she might be too tall for her age. This would be even stronger if one considered wasting z-scores (weight over age). Here, increasing z-scores strongly above O reflect obesity that negatively affects the health status (De Onis and Blossner, 2000) . 23 Another limitation when calculating the NIGIC is that some variables of the non-income indicators do not vary much between households. This holds especially for under 5 and under 1 survival in Bolivia, which is low at the household level. For both years, Table 1 shows that from the 3 rd decile upwards, the max-22 One complicating aspect arises when taking gender preferences for the children into account. The loss of one child when considered as an investment good might depend on the cultural habits (e.g., labor market opportunities for females and males, marriage agreements, and the question who takes care of the parents in old age). 23 In particular, several studies show that obesity in childhood negatively affects the development of the child, which is an increasing concern in developing countries (see, e.g., Dietz (1998) or Martorell et al. (1998)).
Melanie Grosse -9783631753538 Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/03/2019 11:16:24PM via free access imum value of 100 percent under 1 survival is already reached in both years, so that no improvement is possible any more. This translates into growth rates of 0, so that the unconditional NIGIC becomes flat and takes the value of 0 from the 3 rd decile onward. The problem of flat curves always arises when the variable values are bounded above (as for example a maximum of 19 years of schooling or 8 vaccinations). This raises the general question in which case the unconditional curves are helpful or not when analyzing non-income dimensions (see the discussion below in Section 3.4.2 and especially for Figure 3 .6 on under 5 survival).
Dealing with this limitation in a more general way, the discussed variables have a more discrete or even dummy character (in the sense that a child either has survived or not) which makes it difficult to observe relative differences among individuals, households, and over time. This is why these indicators (such as mortality rates) are mostly generated and interpreted at an aggregate level. The only, but small, variation evolves from taking household averages instead of individual data. This is why these variables-and all kinds of dummy variables-show little variation for the pro-poor growth analysis using the NIGIC.
More interesting to examine in these cases is the conditional NIGIC, in which we link the non-income variables to income. Here, low variation is less problematic than for the unconditional NIGIC because the variables are ranked by income. As Table 3 .3 and all figures show, there is no flat part any more. Now we generate interesting information regarding the changes on the non-income indicators when ranked according to their income situation and how improvements are distributed.
Empirical Analysis
Inequality
Bolivia is one of the countries with a very unequal income distribution in Latin America. Table 3 .2 shows the distribution of income and the non-income indicators (unconditional) and Table 3 .3 shows the distribution of the non-income indicators for the conditional case, i.e., when the non-income indicators are ranked by income.
We find high and persisting income inequality as measured with the Gini coefficient that falls from 0.56 in 1989 to 0.54 in 1998. This high inequality is also reflected in the high and only slightly falling 100: 10 ratio. Turning from inequality to growth, we find that all deciles increased their incomes. Especially in the 1990s, Bolivia experienced relatively high growth rates (which also were pro-poor in urban and rural areas). However, Bolivia was and is one of the poorest countries of the region, and the positive economic trend has reversed since 1999 combined with some episodes of social and political turmoil. Bolivia used to show much worse outcomes in social indicators than other countries in the region. However, there have been notable and sustained improvements in many social indicators since the late 1980s, which continued to improve during the recent economic slowdown (Klasen et al., 2007) . 24 Looking at the unconditional case (Table 3. 2), the Gini for education variables are all in the range of 0.40 to 0.50. 25 As stated above, due to the boundedness of the variable, one cannot infer directly from this that educational inequality is in some sense substantively smaller than income inequality. 26 For all educational variables, the Gini fall between 1989 and 1998, which is likely due to the fact that the rich have already reached high levels of education and the poor are catching up. Interesting to note is that the highest Gini coefficients exist for the group of all respondents both for average and maximum education indicating a gender bias in educational achievements. These findings are also reflected in the 100: 1 0 ratio. The conditional deciles, which are shown in Table 3 .3 also show that the level of schooling increases with increasing income for all educational variables, but the 100: 10 ratio is much lower than in the unconditional case. We find that an improvement has been made for all educational variables in all deciles for both the unconditional and the conditional case (Tables 3.2 and 3. 3). However, as already both tables show, improvements where much higher in the unconditional than in the conditional case indicating that the improvements in non-income indicators of poor, when they are ranked by income, are less clear than if the improvements are linked to the initial level in the respective non-income indicator.
The extremely low Gini for the under 1 and under 5 survival rates can be explained by the overall low incidence of child mortality in Bolivia at the household level. For both age groups, child mortality is below 10 percent. The conditional deciles indicate that mortality seems to be more or less randomly distributed over the income distribution (Table 3. 3). 27 For vaccination, the Gini falls strongly from 1989 to 1998, and we find clear improvements, especially for the lower deciles (except the lowest decile), which is also due to the fact that the best vaccinated 24 See also the Introduction and Overview section of this book. 25 All non-income indicators show in generally lower Gini coefficients compared to income. As Klasen (2008b) notes, this is only the case for countries (like Bolivia), where the richest groups are already close to the upper bound. This is, for example, not the case for many African countries as shown by Thomas et al. (2000) who calculate Gini coefficients for education. 26 One should also be aware of the fact that the calculation of the Gini of the social indicators are based on discrete variables. Although income also is strictly discrete, it has a much more continuous character then social indicators like years of education. Thus, it is much more difficult to calculate a Lorenz curve for years of schooling given the lower boundary (0) and upper boundary (18), and the Gini should be interpreted with caution. An attempt to face this problem as addressed by Thomas et al. (2000) . 27 As explained below, reasons for this might be the overall low mortality risk in Bolivia and the tendency for underreporting among poorer population groups.
Melanie Grosse -9783631753538 Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/03/2019 11:16:24PM via free access deciles had only limited room for improvements. The inequality of the stunting z-score is relatively low and falls slightly. Malnutrition decreases with an increasing position in the income distribution, but the differences for the income deciles are quite low. Table 3 .4 shows the distribution of the composite welfare index. The CWI reflects the findings from above where the Gini coefficients decrease for the selected variables. For the CWI (both excluding and including income), the Gini coefficient is higher for the big sample than for the small sample indicating betweengroup inequality. 28 Table 3 .4 also illustrates the difference in the values of the indices if income is included and excluded. If income is included into the index, the level of values decreases, both in the unconditional and the conditional case, which is driven by the high and persisting income inequality in Bolivia. ::i:: .... Figure 3 .1 shows the relative and absolute GIC for income. The relative GIC plots the annual growth rates in monthly household per capita income for each household of the distribution. The absolute GIC plots absolute increases in real Bolivianos for the whole period 1989-1998 for each percentile. Included are (also in all other figures) the bootstrapped 95 percent confidence intervals 29 and the moderate and extreme poverty headcounts for 1989 of 77 and 56 percent, respectively. 
Pro-Poor Growth
--Absolute GIC --95% Cl abs.
As can be seen from the position and slope of the GIC, income growth was propoor in the weak absolute and relative sense since the curve is above O for all and negatively sloped for nearly all percentiles. As expected, we do not find strong 29 Jn particular, based on the households in both surveys, the bootstrap draws 200 weighted random samples with replacement for each period and calculates the respective percentiles and growth rates (and absolute changes) so that we obtain 200 values per percentile, so to say: 200 GIC and NIGIC. Based on these 200 values, we draw the mean and the standard deviation per percentile and calculate the respective 95 percent confidence intervals. Alternatively, the confidence intervals could be estimated not using mean and standard deviation (which are based on normality assumptions) but to use directly the bootstrapped values (given by the p5 and p95 values). Including the further sampling information was not possible (strata, cluster) since this information is not available in the I 989 survey. Thus, confidence intervals are expected to be too narrow. For the GIC and NIGIC, it it not possible to say how much they are too narrow. (Deaton, 1997, Chapter I .4) gives an example for data on Pakistan in how the inclusion of strata and cluster influences the standard error.
Melanie Grosse -9783631753538 Downloaded from PubFactory at 08/03/2019 11:16:24PM via free access absolute pro-poor growth since the absolute GIC is positively sloped meaning that absolute increases in income were much higher for the non-poor than for the poor. Turning to the absolute GIC, the absolute GIC in Figure 3 .1 clearly shows that income growth in Bolivia was strongly anti-poor using the strong absolute definition. The absolute increments of the rich far exceed those of the poor. Figure 3 .2a shows the relative and absolute unconditional NIGIC for average education per household. Figure 3 .2b shows the relative and absolute conditional (smoothed 30 ) NIGIC for this variable. Note that the confidence intervals of the unconditional NIGIC lie very tight around the NIGIC. The reason for this lies in the discrete character of the social indicator. Each percentile contains households with nearly the same level of years of education, which results in low variations within percentiles and which leads to the very tight confidence intervals around the unconditional growth rates (and absolute changes).
Whereas for the unconditional NIGIC the growth rates and absolute changes are shown for percentiles (1-100), for the conditional NIGIC the growth rates and absolute changes are shown for vintiles (1-20). The reason for using vintiles instead of percentiles is to get a higher number of observations for each group when households are ranked by income. For example, if a percentile contains only 50 households (ranked by income) and if we assign to these households the respective mean years of education, then it is possible to obtain huge variations within each percentile, which results in very wide confidence intervals between the growth over the period, and we will miss to show the income gradient.
For the unconditional NIGIC, Figure 3 .2b, we find pronounced weak absolute as well as relative pro-poor growth. 31 The relative pro-poorness of average education is reflected comparing the PPGR with the GRIM where the PPGR for moderate poverty is 3.89 percent and the PPGR for extreme poverty 4.88, both much higher than the GRIM of 1.80 percent (Table 3 .5).
The conditional NIGIC is more volatile than the unconditional NIGIC and also shows weak absolute and relative pro-poor growth but to a lower extent. Thus, the conditional NIGIC shows that the income-poor have experienced slightly higher educational growth than the average. This is also reflected in the higher PPGR (2.00 percent for moderate and 2.24 percent for extreme poverty) compared to the GRIM (1.80 percent). 30 As the conditional are very volatile, we only include the smoothed conditional NIGIC in the figures to show the major trend of the curves. 31 A noteworthy point appears when looking at the upper part of the unconditional NIGIC and their absolute changes. In the range of the 7th and 8th decile, all curves for the education variables fall below O and become positively sloped afterward. This reduction might not be a deterioration but might be due to a reform of the schooling system, i.e., in the number of years necessary to complete schooling grades. . . 100
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Notes: Notes: For the explanation of the variables, see Table 3 .2. We are using two poverty lines. The moderate poverty line leads to an income 0 §2
headcount of 77 percent and the extreme poverty line to an income headcount of 56 percent, which we also use for the non-income indicators. GRIM: Conditional (Relative and Absolute) Turning to the absolute NIGIC, we do not find strong absolute pro-poor growth for the absolute unconditional NIGIC for education as the slope of the absolute curves in Figures 3.2 and 3 .3 is not negative, but even positive for the poorest deciles. This is quite interesting because it puts the findings of the relative unconditional NIGIC in Figure 3 .2a in perspective where we have found high relative pro-poor growth for the first 3 deciles. This seemingly contradictory finding is largely due to the high growth rates for the lower deciles which results from the very low base in 1989. The absolute conditional NIGIC is virtually flat, meaning that the income-poor have not been able to improve their educational attainment by more than the average. These findings are also reflected in comparing the PPCH with the CHIM. As Table 3 .5 shows, the unconditional PPCH is still larger than the CHIM, however, only slightly: the average years of schooling only increased by 1.18 years in mean, and by 1.30 years for the moderately poor and 1.34 for the extremely poor. For the absolute conditional changes and for both poverty lines, the CHIM is higher than the PPCH of 1.01.
Another way to look at intra-household inequalities is to look at the gender gaps in education of individual couples within households. To remind, we calculate the female minus male education in the households in years of education, thus the maximum distance would be 16 years (translating in an indicator ranking theoretically from -16 (for the case of a man with full and a woman with no education) to +16). In 1989, the first 60 percentiles exhibit a negative gap (thus, a better educated husband), the next 20 percentiles show the same level of education, and the last 20 percentiles exhibit a positive gap (thus, a better educated wife). In 1998, this unequal distribution of education is slightly reduced, with the same level of education reached at the 55 th percentile and the positive gap at the 77 th percentile.
Ranking the households by this gap, we plot in Figure 3 .4 the unconditional and conditional absolute change in the gender gap. We find that the intra-household gender gaps were reduced for nearly all households except for those between the 10 th and the 20 th percentile. Again, especially households in the middle of the distribution showed the strongest reductions (Figure 3.4a) . The large flat part between percentile 60 and 80 show the part of the distribution where the gap is the same for around 20 percentiles. When looking at the conditional NIGIC, we find no clear trend meaning that the reduction in gender gaps is equally distributed across all income groups (Figure 3.4b) .
Figures 3.5a and 3.5b show the results for average vaccination. The unconditional NIGIC shows pro-poor growth in the weak absolute sense and is also slightly negatively sloped. Table 3 .5 confirms the pro-poorness in the relative Figure 3 .4: NIGIC for Gender Gap in Education, 1989 Education, -1998 Unconditional (.l.':/..olule Change) 127 sense. Here, both PPGR exceed the GRIM. However, improvements are relatively low, which was also shown in Table 3 .2. 32 The conditional NIGIC shows no clear pro-poor growth trend, also visible in the wide confidence intervals. In addition, the PPGR are lower than the GRIM and 32 Interesting to note is the bump around the 70th percentile. Whereas the flat parts of the curves before and after the bump show the percentiles that had 7 and 8 vaccinations in both periods respectively, the bump shows the improvements of those who had vaccinations between 7 and 8 in the initial period.
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for some deciles we even find a deterioration. The same findings also hold for the absolute curves. This reveals that relative pro-poor growth might not be enough for the poor and that absolute increases (the amount of additional vaccinations) are of particular weight. Finally, it is essential for the health status of children to have all possible vaccinations. The conditional absolute NIGIC shows that the improvements are relatively equally distributed among the income groups. When examining the high relative growth in the unconditional NIGIC for education and vaccinations, Figures 3.2a and 3.5a do not report growth rates for the very poor deciles. This is due to two reasons. First, the very poor began and ended with no education and no vaccinations (see discussion below). Second, the slightly better off started with no education or no vaccination and ended up having positive levels of education and vaccinations in the second year. But in this case the growth rate is not defined and, thus, not reported. Remember that the very high growth rates that appear on the graphs at the left are, therefore, based on percentiles who had some small amount of education and vaccinations, and even a moderate absolute expansion translates into a very high growth rate.
Examining the absolute unconditional NIGIC for education and vaccinations also reveals an important finding regarding the very low tail of the distribution. As  Figures 3.2a, 3 .3a, and 3.5a show, the very education-poor (vaccination-poor) had no education (vaccinations) in the first year and this continued to be the case in the second year. This is true for the first few deciles in the education indicator and nearly the entire first decile in the vaccination indicator. Thus, whatever expansion has taken place in non-income improvements, it bypassed a core group of very poor. 33 For all the other educational variables, we confirm the findings above. Comparing the results for females with males, we find some signs for gender inequality, which are most obvious in the lower percentiles. But we find that the gender inequality seems to have been reduced because the average and maximal education for females increased by more years than for the other groups, especially for males (Tables 3.2 and 3.5). However, the women in the all respondents sample started from a lower level and are on average still worse educated.
For both survival variables, the unconditional NIGIC and the absolute NIGIC are only interpretable for the first few deciles where they show clear improvements in the sense of weak absolute and relative pro-poor growth, but they become flat from the 4 th decile onward in the case of under 5 survival since 100 percent survival is already reached as shown in Figures 3.6a and 3 .6b. Also the conditional NIGIC, which oscillate closely to O but always above, reflects the moderate and more or less equally distributed mortality risk for the income groups. Also, the deciles of Table 3 .3 show only a small income gradient of mortality risk. The example of survival rates shows that unconditional curves are less helpful in some of the non-income dimensions compared to conditional curves. This holds for variables that have a low variation in the data, and the extreme example where the unconditional curves are hardly useful are dummy variables. This is why Grosse 33 Toe findings with the education indicator have to be treated with some caution as they may simply say that adult women that had no education in the first survey continue to have no education in the second survey, which is to be expected in the absence of adult education programmes. This is not the case, however, with the vaccination indicator as it refers to children between ages I and 5 and, thus, it is indeed worrying that a new cohort of children has grown up without any vaccinations.
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Condltlonel (Relative and Abeolute) Figures 3.7a and 3.7b show the NIGIC for stunting. The unconditional NIGIC indicates weak absolute and relative pro-poor growth. For the conditional NIGIC, we only find weak absolute but no relative pro-poor growth. These results are also found when looking at the PPGR and the GRIM for the improvements in the stunting z-score. Both absolute NIGIC show that the absolute changes are distributed nearly equally over the sample. 
COndltlonal (Reltt. and Abeolute) Aggregating the several variables in the CWI, Figures 3.8a and 3.8b summarize the development of the social indicators in one single NIGIC. As expected, we find pro-poor growth in the weak absolute and relative sense for the unconditional NIGIC. Looking at Table 3 .5, we find very high relative pro-poor growth as both PPGR clearly exceed the GRIM. As being somewhat more volatile the conditional NIGIC shows also pro-poor growth in the weak absolute but not in the relative sense. Asking for pro-poor growth in the strong absolute sense, we find an anti-poor trend for the lower end of the distribution for the unconditional absolute NIGIC and a more or less equally distributed trend for the conditional absolute NIGIC. Altogether, for nearly all variables, we find the strongest increases in the unconditional absolute NIGIC for some medium groups but not for the poorest groups. For most of the percentiles, we find weak absolute pro-poor growth, but we do not find relative pro-poor growth, especially not for the poorest. These outcomes mirror the findings of previous analysis about poverty in Bolivia (Republic of Bolivia, 2001; INE, 2004; World Bank, 2004) , which also find improvements in income and non-income poverty but not for the very poor. 34 Nevertheless, Bolivia remains one of the poorest countries in Latin America in the income as well as in the non-income dimension.
However, one should bear in mind that the findings regarding the NIGIC come from a period when there were great improvements made in social indicators, particularly among middle and lower income groups. When translating these measures to other countries (particularly in Africa) it could well be that the NIGIC would show that growth rates were not pro-poor as was found by Gi.inther et al. (2006) for Mali from 1995-2001. To illustrate this, we additionally present the NIGIC for individual education of the household head and partner for Burkina Faso between 1994 and 2003 in Figures 3.9a and 3.9b. 35 Figure 3.9a nicely illustrates that the improvements in education between the two periods have been made only for the upper 30 percentiles, whereas all other groups are bypassed from improvements. This means that no pro-poor growth is found for Burkina Faso between 1994 and 2003 and that only the initially educated population group has experienced relative and absolute improvements, which was not found for Bolivia. When looking at Figure 3 .9b, we see that the relative and absolute improvements in years of education show no significant income gradient. 34 Most of the improvement furthermore benefited mainly the urban population with little improvement in the rural areas. 35 
Conclusion
We introduced the multidimensionality of poverty into the pro-poor growth measurement. The purpose is to overcome the major shortcoming of the existing pro-poor growth measurements, which are exclusively focussed on income but give no information on how social indicators changed over time for poor population groups. The aim is to better monitor the MDGs and not only to focus on the income dimension of poverty.
In our approach, we apply the methodology of the GIC to non-income indicators and investigate pro-poor growth of non-income indicators using the NIGIC. We analyze how income and non-income indicators changed in favor of the poor. Also, we analyze how social indicators have developed when they are linked to their position in the income distribution. This is of special interest when evaluating distributional welfare impact of aid and public spending. Furthermore, we take absolute inequality explicitly into account and analyze if absolute improvements are large enough for the poor to catch up. Reducing absolute inequality in social indicators is crucial for sustainable development and for equal choices.
We exemplarily illustrate this approach using data for Bolivia from 1989 to 1998. Using the GIC and the unconditional NIGIC, we find improvements both in the income and non-income dimensions of poverty which is a common finding for Bolivia. Growth was pro-poor in the weak absolute and the relative sense both for income and non-income indicators, whereas we find no pro-poor growth in the strong absolute sense for income and only limited strong absolute pro-poor growth for the middle percentiles for non-income indicators. However, in general this is not the case when using the conditional NIGIC, where the social indicators were sorted by the initial income. 36 Thus, there is not at all a perfect overlap of income-poor and of non-income-poor households. These findings suggest that the improvements in non-income dimensions were more focussed on the initially poor in those indicators, whereas they were not focussed on the initially income-poor. The absolute changes show that the poor have not benefited disproportionately more from the improvements. This means that relative pro-poor growth does not automatically mean that the poor catch up with the non-poor in absolute terms because we find that relative income and non-income inequality have fallen, but not absolute inequality.
When calling for pro-poor growth as the most significant policy measure to achieve the MDGs, policy makers should not only focus on income pro-poor growth rather on multidimensional dimensions of pro-poor growth and, therefore, take non-income indicators explicitly into account. We have shown that the income-poor are not automatically the ones that benefit most from growth in social indicators, which is an important and new finding. In addition, policy makers should also give attention to pro-poor growth in the strong absolute sense in order to accelerate progress in meeting the MDGs.
